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ESSAY

The Primary Right
CARTER DILLARD*

I.

INTRODUCTION

“I wish to speak a word for Nature, for absolute freedom and
wildness, as contrasted with a freedom and culture merely civil.”1
This essay seeks to fill a gap in the law: the conspicuous
absence among commonly accepted civil and political human
rights2 theories of any particular right that tells us where the
other rights ought to exist – not the jurisdictions in which they
apply, but what the physical world those other rights occupy
ought to look like. In other words, what sort of environment do
humans have a right to?
This essay fills the gap by adding one right to the list of
commonly accepted civil and political human rights, what can be

*Visiting Scholar, Vulnerability and Human Condition Initiative, Emory

University School of Law, Spring, 2012; Director of Litigation, Animal Legal
Defense Fund. This essay was originally presented at the United Nations World
Civic Forum in 2009, and altered substantially based on excellent comments
provided by the faculty in a workshop at Loyola University New Orleans,
College of Law. I owe special thanks to the participants of a workshop at the
Just World Institute, University of Edinburgh, for comments on a related article
that challenged me to develop the notion of bare autonomy, and to the many
commentators who reviewed early drafts. As always I owe my greatest thanks
to Kate Fletcher, my research assistant, without whom this essay would not be
possible. This essay is dedicated to Christopher Johnson McCandless.
1. Henry David Thoreau, Walking, in THE PORTABLE THOREAU 592 (Carol
Bode ed., 1964).
2. See generally PAUL SIEGHART, THE LAWFUL RIGHTS OF MANKIND: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CODE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1985).
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called “the primary right.” The primary right is a general human
claim-right3 to completely exit all polities and enter states of nonpolity or wilderness (a specialized concept related to but not
synonymous with legal wilderness, described in detail below), or
places where there is an absence of human political association,
and absence of others’ power, control, or influence.
The right is derived from the premise that in order for
individuals to be truly autonomous they must consent to being a
part of a political system. Further, unless there exists an
alternative to participation in a political system – a right to walk
away from all human polities – consent is meaningless if not
impossible and individual autonomy is thus undermined. How
can you consent to something if you have no alternative? In a
world filled with political association, or others’ power and
influence, non-consent to political association becomes impossible.
Logically, if one values consensual political association, one must
also value the alternatives to political association, i.e., places void
of human influence, which would make choosing to associate
possible.
The essential insight of this essay is thus that
wilderness is inextricable from autonomy and must therefore be
preserved, and perhaps restored, to allow persons to access it as
an alternative to others’ power, control, and influence. Properly
understood, liberal political philosophy must value wilderness
because only access to the wilderness can make possible truly
consensual human political society.
The primary right demands strong environmental
protections, and responds to recent arguments that a religious or
non-rational basis is needed to support environmental protection
because those protections often only benefit the non-human
world. Also, the primary right directly addresses three distinct
but related problems facing environmental law theorists today:
how to choose a baseline from which to develop environmental

3. A claim-right is a right to claim another person’s duty to do or not do
something, as opposed to a liberty (or liberty-right) which is the absence of a
duty to do or not do something. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J.
16 (1913).
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regulation,4 how to articulate environmental rights, including a
human right to a particular environment, and how to define what
we mean by the term overpopulation. While discussed in detail
below, the primary right begins to address these problems by
posing a simple question: do you, at this moment, as you read
these lines, have reasonable access to the non-human world?
While the right is based upon the objective value of autonomy
through consent, recognizing and protecting the right would have
desirable consequences as well: relevant to climate change, urban
sprawl, the loss of species, the spread of toxins, etc., as well as
social consequences, not the least of which would be how
thoughtful persons, if truly respecting the primary right, would
have to become about bringing other persons into the world. As
should become clear, had the human rights theorists that,
decades ago, developed the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
been thinking along the lines of the primary right, we likely
would not be faced with the mass environmental degradation and
threat of climate change that exists today.
The picture that will emerge then is not a state called
Wilderness to which all of the non-human world has been
relegated (an error I refer to below as the “territory trap” and
which obviously would entail significant human influence), but
polities in a sea of wilderness, islands of consensual human
political association in a sea of non-polity. Is this so fantastical?
It describes our world today, the oceans being relatively
autonomous zones between growing masses of human power and
influence.5 But we ought not to be forced to sea6 in order to be
free.
This essay is, at base, a normative argument for a human
right to wilderness, a right that effectively buttresses the
presently rickety foundation of environmental lawmaking. Its

4. See generally DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010).
5. I owe this point to Derek Fincham.
6. The Seasteading Institute’s mission is to further the establishment and
growth of permanent, autonomous ocean communities, enabling innovation with
new political and social systems. See THE SEASTEADING INSTITUTE, http://
seasteading.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2012).
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claims sit comfortably between political philosophy and
normative environmental law theory, using truths from the
former about consent and legitimacy to solve problems in the
latter, a field struggling to justify the inherent value of the nonhuman world against seemingly competing liberal values. That
said, the concept of the primary right will seem foreign to many
liberals who conceive of autonomy as the absence of restraint,
something subsumed by the more demanding notion of autonomy
as the absence of others’ influence.
Others will find such a highly theoretical discussion
irrelevant to positive law and the practice of environmental
regulation. But lawyers and lawmakers should be able explain
why we have environmental law at all, and why it is justified.
The primary right does that by framing a totally novel answer
with liberal political premises that many who oppose
environmental regulation accept. Environmentalists have a
human rights claim to make, and a powerful one. The primary
right justifies environmental protections which trump many other
competing interests, so much so that weakening or repealing
things like the Wilderness or Endangered Species Acts7 would not
only be wrong, but constitute a grievous violation of human
rights.
Part II of this essay lays out the theoretical argument for a
right to completely exit human society – the primary right – and
will distinguish this right from traditional exit rights. Part III
demonstrates that complete exit requires access to and protection
of wilderness. Part IV then bridges exit rights theory and
environmental law theory, demonstrating that the primary right
solves, heretofore substantial, challenges to environmental law
theory. Finally, Part V lays out and responds to likely
counterarguments to the claims made herein. Future work will
show that the primary right can be supported by positive law,
both domestic and international, and that protecting and
furthering the primary right is politically, economically, and
culturally feasible.

7. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531—44); Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131—1136).
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CONCEIVING THE PRIMARY RIGHT

What is the first or primary human right8 – that particular
act or state of being which we first permit or refuse another
person when we are working out how we will treat each other,
and upon which the rights and duties we then hash out together
may arguably rest? Many have said, at least in passing, that
particular rights are primary. Thomas Paine said that the right
to vote “is the primary right by which other rights are protected,”
because without it we are subjected to the will of other persons.9
Others have considered whether it is the right to speak freely
that is the primary right,10 or the “inherent worth of each
person,”11 while some have said that “the right to food is the
Many, like Louis Henkin, have
primary human right.”12

8. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 181 (Oxford Univ. Press
1986) [hereinafter RAZ, MORALITY] (“Assertions of rights are typically
intermediate conclusions in arguments from ultimate values to duties.”). See
also id. at 166 ("‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights and, other things
being equal, an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.” Generally, human rights
claims are based on those interests we believe we have, and which others ought
to value and respect, simply because we are human. Readers who know Raz’s
work will be surprised to see him cited in a claim that will appear at first glance
to support a choice-based, rather than an interest-based, right. As will be made
clear below, the primary right protects (as a negative right) and furthers (as a
positive right) an interest in what will be called bare autonomy. Bare autonomy
is different and should be unbundled from the form of autonomy Raz critiques as
the “simple principle,” but also from the form of autonomy, “valuable autonomy,”
Raz defends. Id. at 12-14, 381; JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS 1118 (1999) [hereinafter RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS]; see also Donald H. Regan,
Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. 995, 998 (1989).
9. Thomas Paine, Dissertation on First Principles of Government (1795), in
THE THOMAS PAINE READER 452 (Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick eds., 1987).
10. See Sydney Kentridge, Freedom of Speech: Is it the Primary Right?, 45
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 253 (1996).
11. Helen Ginger Berrigan, "Speaking Out" About Hate Speech, 48 LOY. L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (2002) (“[T]he Europeans and international human rights community
promote as the primary human right the inherent worth of each person,
including all the trait-based qualities that make up that person's identity.”).
12. Christoph Stueckelberger, Food Crisis: The Right to Food is the Primary
Human Right, TAGES-ANZEIGER, Apr. 17, 2008, at 27 (“The right to freedom of
expression or political participation is of no use at all to the person dying of
hunger.”).
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described the right to life as the primary human right.13
However, Winston Churchill said that it is “the primary right of
men to die and kill for the land they live in,”14 and U.S.
constitutional scholars have argued that both Blackstone and the
Framers saw self-defense as the primary human right.15
I will argue that none of these can properly be deemed the
primary right, at least in the sense of being the first act or state
of being the permission or refusal of which is, as a descriptive
matter, determined when working out how one person will treat
another. Instead, we must obviously determine whether we, or
the other person in question, are to be part of the particular
system of rights and duties at issue. That is, whether we will
treat each other at all. The primary human behavior or state of
being determined by any system of rights is of course whether I,
the putative right-holder in question, am even part of it. No right
or duty in that system applies to me if I am not part of it; thus
determining whether I am or not is primary.16
Additionally, as a normative matter, asserting the primary
right is to assert that one ought to be able to choose to consent or
not consent to any and all political systems. To the extent
consent is necessary to justify political association17 (something
13. See Phillip A. Aka, Analyzing U.S. Commitment to Socioeconomic Human
Rights, 39 AKRON L. REV. 417, 451 (2006) (quoting Louis Henkin, The Universal
Declaration and the U.S. Constitution, 31 PS. POL. SCI. & POLITICS 512, 515
(1998)) (“The primary human right that can be protected in all situations by the
international community is the right to life. . . . [T]he most fundamental right is
the right of existence.”).
14. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES:
THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN 27 (1956).
15. See Don B. Kates, A Modern Historiography of the Second Amendment, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1211, 1221 (2009).
16. The claim made herein, that a particular form of exit right called the
primary right ought to be recognized, should be distinguished from “primary
rights” as that term is used in Allen Buchanan’s helpful typology dividing rights
to secede into primary right and remedial right theories. See Allen Buchanan,
Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1997). There is an obvious
connection between that typology and how I use the term “primary,” but
“primary” as used in the typology refers to non-remedial theories of secession by
groups of people (that is, not derived from or seeking to remedy some injustice),
rather than the primary human right I discuss herein.
17. Communitarians will deny this premise but this short essay will not
defend the idea of consent-based political association, mostly because that
defense already occupies whole shelves of libraries, and because this essay
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taken as a given by many liberals and referred to as the
Fundamental Liberal Principle),18 consent is necessary to justify
any amount of political association. Conceptually, once one
withdraws consent, what legitimacy does the State (or any other
person) have to any amount of your continued association? Also,
if you believe that you have to give your consent to be subject to
another’s will, what legitimates others changing the world in
which you live – at all – without your consent? Second, to the
extent one has the general right to withdraw consent and exit a
polity, she or he has the right to exit all polities. Otherwise, one
would simply be compelled to associate with the least
objectionable polity.
Third, the right to exit all polities
completely requires access to, and therefore the continued
existence of, non-polity or wilderness. Without it there is no
possibility of not consenting. Therefore, to the extent consent is
necessary to justify political association, wilderness must
continue to exist and persons must have access to it.
The primary right is oriented around a theoretical ideal or
value we call wilderness, the way other rights are oriented
around other theoretical ideals or values like free speech, privacy,
and due process. Though we never totally achieve those values or
ideals, mostly because we have to balance them against
competing ideals and values like national security, they very
much exist and we know this because we use them to guide our
behavior, much the way our ideal of the perfect home guides our
behavior though we may never quite achieve it. The ideal at the
core of the primary right, wilderness, non-polity, or the absence of
political association is used as a baseline to counterbalance
conflicting values; the argument that what the right calls for can
never be completely achieved misses the mark. The idea will be
to strive towards the ideal as a matter of degree as one
accommodates conflicting interests, the way we still strive
towards free speech, privacy, and due process in the face of the
specifically targets liberals who overlook the limits liberalism logically places on
how we treat the nonhuman world.
18. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. A corollary to the right to leave
a polity by withdrawing one’s consent to political association is the authority one
has to consent (or not) to the admission of new members into one’s existing
polity. See Carter Dillard, Antecedent Law: The Law of People-Making, 79 MISS.
L.J. 873, 895-99 (2010).
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conflicting value of perfect national security without ever
perfectly satisfying any of those values.
The right is based upon the objective values of the things the
right protects: consent, autonomy, and wilderness, the last being
something humans have throughout the history of our species
had easy access to but which in the flash of two centuries has
been almost eradicated. That the right is based on objective
values is important. That means it is to be protected, irrespective
of subjective preference, market outcomes, and the democratic
process. Just as the right to vote is not contingent on what the
majority thinks or the people actually voting, the primary right is
not defeated by counterarguments about mass personal
preference. As will be discussed below, wilderness is also
objective in another sense: it is an object with the potential to be
converted to any number of subjective uses, each valuable to
different groups of humans users, but which remain in its
unconverted, or objective, state.
Before proceeding to justify and develop the contours of this
right, it is worth pinning down certain key conceptions.
A. Foundational Conceptions
To begin with, to speak of individual rights is to speak of
autonomy. All individual rights assume that there exists a range
of individual behavior, or conduct, which is worth protecting from
others.19
The concept of “autonomy” can be unbundled into various
conceptions.20 Two such conceptions are what Joseph Raz calls
the “the simple principle” and “valuable autonomy.”21 The former
(which I will refer to as the failed form of autonomy) is the

19. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 8.
20. Privacy and autonomy are closely related concepts but I focus on the
latter because privacy seems to commonly involve questions about personal
information, which is not particularly relevant to the primary right. That said,
Ruth Gavison’s conception of privacy as being completely inaccessible to others
is similar to what I call “bare autonomy” herein. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and
the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980); but cf., Note, Legal Analysis and
Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1856, 1910 nn.
231-32 (1971).
21. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 8.
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presumption in favor of protecting, under the guise of
intrinsically valuable freedom, all conduct as equally valuable
without regard to the specific value or disvalue we may find in
the particular conduct at issue.22 . This is simply the view that
autonomy involves choosing to do, and doing, whatever one
wishes. In my view it is a form of intellectual laziness, the broad
claim that one ought to be able to do anything, everything, and
nothing at once, which masks him or her avoiding the trouble of
thinking it all through and delineating the oughts from the
noughts. Raz critiques this form of autonomy in favor of what he
calls valuable autonomy.23
For Raz, “[a]utonomy is valuable only if exercised in pursuit
of the good,” and valuable autonomy is the presence and active
pursuit of morally valuable options in life (i.e., the option to
become a doctor, but not a mass murderer; to save a person, but
not torture them; to be literate, but not illiterate; to care for
animals, but not abuse them).24 Raz rejects the moral relativism
and subjectivism that underlie claims to a general right to be
free, finding that we value freedom only once we have certain
capacities, and then only because it lets us do things that are
good, things we objectively value.25
A third form of autonomy, which I will call “bare autonomy,”
is the state of being physically individuated from other persons
and their influence, or becoming literally independent from
others and therefore self-determining. The term bare autonomy
is novel but the conception can easily be derived from the common
conception of individual autonomy.26 It is this form of autonomy

22. See RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS, supra note 8, at 11-18; see generally Regan,
supra note 8.
23. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 8, at 381.
24. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 8, at 381. See also Leslie Green, Un-American
Liberalism: Raz's ‘Morality of Freedom’, 38 TORONTO L.J. 317, 324-25 (1988).
25. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 8, at 381.
26. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Individual autonomy is an idea that is generally understood to refer
to the capacity to be one's own person, to live one's life according to
reasons and motives that are taken as one's own and not the product
of manipulative or distorting external forces. . . .
. . . Put most simply, to be autonomous is to be one's own person, to
be directed by considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics
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that the primary right is meant to protect, being “free” as in when
one says “she broke free,” or “she was finally free of him.”
Bare autonomy is the conceptual inverse of being subjected to
the influence, control and power of other humans.27 It borrows
from Isaiah Berlin’s concept of negative liberty, which at its core
refers to the absence of constraint by others.28 Bare autonomy
goes one step further, and recognizes that to the extent other
persons have changed the non-human environment they have
exercised power over others. They have interfered with me and
others being free of their influence, being free of what Locke
called the “Will of any other Man,”29 and thus free of the
subjective changes they make and will upon the world. They
have interfered with my relationship to the objective world
making me subject to their influence, their changes, and thus
their will. They and their will have gotten in the way, standing
between me and a world without their will, or what we call
wilderness, or non-polity, or the absence of others’ influence or
will, a conception which I deal with more below.
As will be discussed, one can see that the purest form of bare
autonomy would be obtained by living in wilderness, free of all
human influence. This is a state of affairs comparable to Ruth
Gavison’s perfect privacy: being completely inaccessible to
others.30 Or, borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis when he
referred to the right to privacy, it is “the right to be [literally] let

that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part of
what can somehow be considered one's authentic self.
John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2009). Though
Christman does not discuss bare autonomy as a form of autonomy, he uses the
word “one” six times in describing the basic conception of individual autonomy,
creating an overwhelming sense of individuation, of the act of one individuating
oneself from others.
27. The focus is on humans, as opposed to other species, because humans as a
species seem to have a special capacity to influence the world and are the agents
we exclusively award personhood to in the model of the social contract.
28. See ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1969).
29. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
30. See Gavison, supra note 20.
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alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.31
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
As an aside, United States constitutional jurisprudence can be
reinterpreted to create a helpful analogy for understanding all of these
conceptions, between what we are calling the primary right and privacy in
modern substantive due process. Of course there is no express right to exit in
the constitution. Yet substantive due process, and specifically the right to
privacy it recognizes, are comparable. How can we justify the fundamental right
of privacy (or for some who see a change in the jurisprudence after Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), liberty) as it appears in modern substantive due
process? Readers may have guessed how the primary right relates to this
problem already. It is well known that in the Court’s modern substantive
jurisprudence it recognizes a continuum (or spectrum) of liberty. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973). Could the vague fundamental right to privacy
or liberty the Court invokes on occasion as a right protecting interests inside the
polity, be tacitly speaking to (and bundled together with) the value of bare
autonomy outside of the polity?
How are we to make sense of Justice Kennedy’s use, in Lawrence v.
Texas, of the oft-critiqued statement from Planned Parenthood v. Casey which
described the heart of U.S. constitutional liberty as “the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life,” and asserted that “[b]eliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State”?
539 U.S. at 574. Are these claims meaningless as some have said? See, e.g.,
Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1577 (2004).
Consider that the Court’s description of liberty in Lawrence ties back to
Griswold v. Connecticut and Olmstead v. United States before it. Simplified, the
Casey quote describes what the Court in Griswold, and Justice Brandeis in his
dissent in Olmstead, described as “the right to be let alone – the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). One cannot seriously argue that
this is a meaningless statement, any more than one can argue that the
statement “leave me alone” is meaningless. Defining one’s self and one’s
concepts, or being autonomous and self-determining, is like defining anything
else; it is the act of setting the thing apart from its surroundings to permit an
identity.
That said, there are degrees of being left alone. A woman permitted by
the state to terminate her pregnancy without interference from that state and
others is left alone more than if she were not permitted to do it. But she is not
literally alone. She is still part of the system of rights and duties, and is not
alone in that sense. The state and others are ready to swoop down upon her if
she acts in certain other ways. Being literally let alone, or autonomous and selfdetermining, would only be possible outside of the system of rights and duties,
and indeed, beyond the control and influence of others. I am hardly “let alone”
in my fenced backyard, relative to how I would be “let alone” to explore a
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The concept of bare autonomy will not be acceptable to many
who view humans as inextricably connected,32 though their
critique may prove more descriptive than normative. Again, the
concept may also seem foreign to some liberals who view
autonomy more as the absence of restraint, than the more
comprehensive and demanding notion of autonomy as the absence
of others’ influence. However, it is not clear how one can value
individual autonomy without also valuing bare autonomy, unless
one abandons individuation, which is at the core of the former.
The obvious challenge to the conception of bare autonomy is
that even if one could leave all polities, one simply cannot walk
away from morality and its system of rights and duties.
However, this challenge can actually help us understand the
conception of bare autonomy. If we define morality as Dworkin
does – as how we treat others – then we will understand that
walking away from morality is exactly what is meant by the
primary right: the right not to be treated by others paired with
the dual correlative duties not to treat them.33 Humans in
wilderness are obligated to practice relative noninterference.
This is not as abstract as it may sound, but is consistent with a
wilderness free of human influence. If we consider the Casey and Olmstead
quotes as referring to a continuum of being “let alone,” then the far end of the
continuum, or bare autonomy, is only the complete and meaningful exit from all
polities.
Of course the Supreme Court was never referring to bare autonomy per
se; the cases in question had nothing to do with the far end of the continuum
and were very much about living within a system of rights and duties. That is
not the point of showing that the Court’s statement refers to a continuum that
logically includes bare autonomy (though, assuming one values consent, there is
arguably a strong basis for developing the primary right via the "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" test). Rather, the point here is that to the extent the
Court relies on that continuum as something valuable on which to base a claim
of right, it might have been implicitly recognizing the value of an outside form of
autonomy, bare autonomy, as well as an inside form. More importantly, as is
discussed below, that recognition ties back to like statements in the Framers’
account of the rights of man, and in Locke’s work before that.
At the very least, it is possible the Court has inadvertently bundled
together various forms of autonomy, simultaneously relying on all of the distinct
interests the rights protect to amass support in those reading the Court’s
opinions.
32. See Christman, supra note 26, § 3.2.
33. This is what makes collective exercise of the primary right complex, if not
impossible, and why I refer to exit rather than secession.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5

12

872

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

commonplace, everyday notion familiar to backcountry hikers
known as the wilderness ethic. If morality is how we treat others,
wilderness is that we do not.
Identifying a right as “the primary right” connotes more than
the logical ordering of rights in a system of rights, or the
assertion that the right is foundational or an ultimate trump
card. In this case, “primary” carries teleological implications:
“the primary right” is the right that existed before systems of
rights. It exists in a literal state of wilderness, outside of and
prior to human society and civilization.
Finally, “polity” and “power” must be understood in terms of
a continuum, or degrees, of control and influence that others
exert upon the individual. At one extreme lies absolute control by
humans over another human, forced labor in a prison camp, for
example.
At the other extreme lies the absolute of bare
autonomy, self-determination, and lack of human otherness
experienced by the individual alone in the wilderness. The
absolute power, control, or influence of one human over another is
thus the conceptual inverse of bare autonomy.
Traditional exit right and secession theories address the
space between these poles, where we find varied systems of legal
rights and duties usually enforced by the threat of force and
groups entering and exiting those systems of power (polities) for
any number of reasons. In contrast, the primary right addresses
a move towards the far end of the continuum, towards bare
autonomy.
One can think of this in terms of the concepts of power and
political obligation.34 The latter is the duty I have to obey the
laws of any given polity. The former refers to my being subject to
another’s will or influence. If everyone but me disappeared from
the United States today, I would presumably be under no political
obligation to others, not subject to any particular rights or duties
that come with the legal system, because there would be no one to
owe the duties to or demand the rights from. However, I would
still be largely subject to others’ will and influence – as well as
the system of rights and duties that permitted that will and
influence – because those persons cut down the trees, paved the
34. I owe this point to Dov Fox.
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land, polluted the rivers, and exterminated the animals. I would
be living in a world of others’ making and be made subject to it.
Whether I would be better off there – in the remnants of society –
than I would be in the same space ten thousand years ago is
irrelevant. That is a matter of welfare. The point is that though
I am not under political obligation, I am subject to others’ power.
But the concept of autonomy can be broadened enough to give an
alternative to both political obligation and power. Whatever
autonomy means inside a polity, humans cannot be free in a very
tangible sense if they are bounded in by one another, if others
stand between them and the non-human world. The primary
right seeks to prevent that.
B. The Primary Right Is an Exit Right, a Right to Not
Consent to Others’ Power, Control, and Influence
Bearing these analogies and conceptions in mind and
assuming one justifies polities by whether they are consented to
and those within them can exit or leave, we can begin to define
the primary right. Significantly, the very idea of a human right
only matters in the context of inter-human conduct, that is, how
we treat each other. Thus, the most fundamental question in
dealing with claims of human rights is first whether we will treat
each other at all.
We see this in traditional liberal political theory, and its
reliance on a state of nature as a default backdrop to political
relations. For Locke, “[m]en being . . . by nature all free, equal,
and independent, no one can be put out of this estate [natural
liberty] and subjected to the political power of another without
his own consent.”35 Indeed, as a normative matter, it is perhaps
liberalism’s core principle (or at least one that we can here derive
from the principle of consensual government)36 that persons
ought to be able to walk away from one another, refusing to
35. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ¶ 95 (1690),
reprinted in THE TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960) [hereinafter, LOCKE]; see also JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE,
AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN LOCKE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 213
(2002); JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 137 (1999).
36. See Gerald Gaus & Shane Courtland, Liberalism, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1.1 (2010) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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consent to the power, control, and influence of others when they
wish in order to be let alone.
In two different ways, liberals accord liberty primacy as a
political value. (i) Liberals have typically maintained that
humans are naturally in “a State of perfect Freedom to order their
Actions . . . as they think fit . . . without asking leave, or
depending on the Will of any other Man.” Mill too argued that
“the burden of proof is supposed to be with those who are against
liberty; who contend for any restriction or prohibition. . . . The a
priori assumption is in favour of freedom . . .” . . . This might be
called the Fundamental Liberal Principle: freedom is normatively
basic, and so the onus of justification is on those who would limit
freedom, especially through coercive means. It follows from this
that political authority and law must be justified, as they limit
the liberty of citizens. Consequently, a central question of liberal
political theory is whether political authority can be justified, and
if so, how. It is for this reason that social contract theory . . .
developed . . . Insofar as they take as their starting point a state
of nature in which humans are free and equal, and so argue that
any limitation of this freedom and equality stands in need of
justification (i.e., by the social contract), the contractual tradition
expresses the Fundamental Liberal Principle.37

Rousseau said:
I am presupposing here what I believe I have demonstrated,
namely that in the state there is no fundamental law that cannot
be revoked, not even the social compact. . . . Grotius even thinks
that each person can renounce the state of which he is a member
and recover his natural liberty and his goods by leaving the
country.38

For Rousseau, and many others whose thinking frames our
own thinking and basic assumptions about government today, the
social compact was the “one law that by its nature requires
unanimous consent,” because “civil association is the most
voluntary act in the world,” and “no one can, under pretext

37. Id.
38. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 79 (Donald A. Cress
trans. & ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1987).
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whatever, place another under subjection without his consent.”39
He called that consent, one’s voluntary association, the “primitive
contract.”40
1. The primary right requires complete exit
The primitive contract, a core principle in liberal political
theory, is thus that persons should be free to not consent to
others’ power, control, and influence. Should we then have the
choice to be free from sovereigns, other persons, their “will” in the
form of the changes they make, and influences they have on the
world altogether? Is the state of nature to which we would then
return synonymous with wilderness or parts of the world – nonpolities – where human influence is minimized or eliminated?
Rousseau’s and Locke’s words could be read to say we should and
that it is synonymous. Taking exit right theory to its logical
conclusion does the same.
A right to exit is a right to walk away from any particular
system of rights and duties. It protects what Richard Epstein
calls that act of “picking up stock and going elsewhere.”41 The
right is not only a bedrock of, and “crucial” to, liberal theory,42
but it is required by Rawls’ principles of justice.43 It is also a key
to Nozick’s utopia, where it is the only right (tied to a concomitant
but conditional right to enter) people have.44 Intuitively we value
it highly – imagine not being permitted to move, to leave the bad
and declining neighborhood in which you live.
However, the received wisdom of exit rights theory appears
to be that we can only opt out of subjugation to one sovereign for
another. Ronald Dworkin makes this point in Law’s Empire,
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id.
41. Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 147, 149 (1992).
42. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J.
549, 566 (2001) (“If commons property can succeed only by giving up the right to
exit, a liberal commons is indeed an oxymoron.”); see also Angela R. Riley, Good
(Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1066 (2007).
43. See Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism,
Symposium: Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 704 (2003).
44. See Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional
Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1423 n. 215 (1997).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5

16

876

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

where he critiques tacit consent as a basis for the legitimacy of
modern democracies. He argues that the decision not to emigrate
is insufficient to constitute consent to be governed for reasons
that are very relevant to thinking about a primary right:
Consent cannot be binding on people, in the way this argument
requires, unless it is given more freely, and with more genuine
alternative choice, than just be declining to build a life from
nothing under a foreign flag. And even if the consent were
genuine, the argument would fail as an argument for legitimacy,
because a person leaves one sovereign only to join another; he
has no choice to be free from sovereigns altogether.45

Others have argued that “a state of unencumbered
individuality . . . can just as easily be exercised by a desire to
enter into another culture,”46 or even that “an individual’s
secession claim is ridiculous; a town’s only slightly less so; a
county’s somewhat more plausible; and a state or federal region’s
paradigmatic.”47 Rawls almost suggests the same when, in his
discussion of what “space” is necessary in a just society to allow
the full range of conflicting values, he makes clear that “the idea
of sufficient space is metaphorical.”48 The Supreme Court did
much the same in Wisconsin v. Yoder when it explicitly labeled
Thoreau’s freedom as merely a “philosophical and personal”
choice and contrasted that with the Amish’s legitimate religious
withdrawal from society, thereby denigrating and using
Thoreau’s freedom as a foil to defend what the Court saw as the
Amish’s valid religious claims.49

45. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 193 (1986).
46. Darren C. Zook, Decolonizing Law: Identity Politics, Human Rights, and
the United Nations, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 95, 116 (2006); see also Leighton
McDonald, Can Collective and Individual Rights Coexist?, 22 MELBOURNE U. L.
REV. 310, 331 (1998) (“[W]hether or not an individual is entitled to leave their
cultural group in such circumstances is inevitably a question to be faced by the
group to which emigration is sought.”).
47. Lee Seshagiri, Democratic Disobedience: Reconceiving Self-Determination
and Secession at International Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 553, 583 (2010).
48. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 154-55 nn. 29-30
(2001).
49. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
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Contrary to all of these claims, to the extent one accepts a
right to exit one must also accept the right to exit completely.
Exit is the right “to withdraw or refuse to engage . . . to
dissociate, to cut oneself out of a relationship with other
persons.”50 In terms of positive law, according to Hanoch Dagan
and Michael Heller, “certain rights of exit – such as the right to
emigrate from one’s homeland – are now considered basic human
rights, which are, as such, inalienable and nonwaiveable.”51 In
addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
Dagan and Heller cite, Article 12(2) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights grants every person a right to leave
any country, including his or her own.52
And to the extent one accepts the right to exit, one must
accept the right to exit completely. What does the right otherwise
refer to? The international right to emigrate from one’s homeland
discussed above does not permit the state to impose a duty on
those emigrating to keep one foot in the country or periodically
return. Similarly, while Dagan and Heller find that some
disincentives can be imposed prior to exit, their discussion of the
value of exit as a precept of liberalism never suggests those
exiting could be required to associate post-exit.53
Such a
requirement would frustrate the purpose of the right because one
would never be free to truly walk away. Moreover, a right to
leave any country, like that recognized above, implies a right to
leave all countries.
Also, what are the consequences of Dworkin’s assumption,
above, holding true? One of the more powerful consequentialist
arguments in favor of complete exit rights is that they incentivize
organizations, in this case states, to compete for members. If
members cannot completely leave the least objectionable state,
perhaps to form a state of their own, the baseline for competition
and innovation is skewed and states are not really competing.
We can never do better than the least objectionable state.
50. Dagan & Heller, supra note 42, at 568.
51. Id. at 569 n.79 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13,
G.A. Res. 217(III)(A), U.N. GAOR 3d Sess., pt. 1 at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)).
52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(2), opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
53. See generally Dagan & Heller, supra note 42.
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Moreover, there would seem to be a direct relationship between
the reasonableness of exit and the degree to which one is
committed to the polity in question. How committed can you
really be if exit were virtually impossible?
But the claim that a right to exit includes a right to
completely exit need not rely on positive law or consequentialist
arguments. Conceptually, if consent is to contribute in any way
to legitimizing the use of power, one must have the option not to
consent. Further, if we believe that the use of power must be
justified – that is, that we can differentiate between legitimate
and illegitimate power – then we must justify any and all power,
control or influence, exerted by one person upon another. Again,
conceptually, once one withdraws consent, what legitimacy does
the state (or any other person) have to any amount of your
continued association? To the extent consent is necessary to
justify the power, control, and influence of others, it is necessary
to justify any power, control and influence.
The primary right must, therefore, include the right to an
alternative to being a part of any polity at all. Forcing one to
submit against his or her will to some sovereign, albeit the one
found least objectionable, or even to some small amount of that
sovereign’s influence, vitiates consent-based justification for the
authority of the state, in violation of what Rousseau called the
“primitive contract.”54
2. The primary right imposes duties not to interfere
Once one has walked away from a particular system of rights
and duties, how is one entitled to any duty of continuing
noninterference held against that system and its members to
keep them at bay?
The right to exit is “antecedent to government”55 and “a
prerequisite for liberty.”56 It is neither created, nor extinguished,

54. ROUSSEAU, supra note 38, at 106.
55. Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, Symposium: Reflections on United
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 776 (1995).
56. Dagan & Heller, supra note 42, at 570.
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by the polity one wishes to leave. That is, after all, why the exit
right is unique and primary, and also valuable, preventing the
polity a person leaves from simply recapturing him or her as an
outsider now incapable of asserting duties. The right to exit also
exists conceptually before legal regimes because, as Pufendorf
and the many other theorists cited herein like Rousseau, Grotius,
and Locke have argued, the very legitimacy of the civil law
system is itself based on consent.57
The duty of continuing noninterference called for by the
primary right must therefore be based on a different order of
rights and duties that exists independent of the civil law system.
Just as fundamental human rights constitute a meta-system of
positive law and moral rules that exists a level above domestic
legal systems (codified in treaty through state consent), the right
of exit is an imperative that exists above or outside any consentbased system of social order. Thus, even though one has walked
away from a particular system of rights and duties he or she is
entitled to a duty of continuing noninterference held against that
system and its members.
This does not mean that all fundamental human rights apply
in wilderness. The primary right is again unique in that it is
“antecedent to government,” indeed to social interaction of any
kind, and therefore it arguably exists one level above the system
of fundamental human rights, as a fundamental meta-human
right. As described in more detail below, “wilderness,” in its ideal
form, is the place where a person can experience the ideal of
absolute individual autonomy. Because the primary right rightholder would be outside of all human interaction, there is no
reason to conceive of, let alone assert, any other human rights.
He or she is alone, outside of morality, bound only by the
exclusive correlative duties imposed by the primary right not to
influence others – duties that would logically encompass many of
the fundamental human rights, like respecting others’ right to
life. This is why the ideal nonpolity is not just a physical
wilderness but outside of any jurisdiction; if the duty not to

57. See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS
LIBRI DUO 160-61 (James Brown Scott ed., William Abbot Oldfather trans.,
Clarendon Press 1931) (1672).
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influence others is taken seriously, it is not clear what role any
law would play.
To the extent that the right-holder interacts with other
persons, he or she moves along the polity continuum of human
influence, away from absolute autonomy towards traditional
systems of rights and duties. From this logic, it is now clear why
the primary right is a right of exit rather than secession: while
groups of persons can secede together to take advantage of in
vacuis locis and establish a community, that new community is
itself a polity with attendant traditional rights and duties. While
respecting the primary right will require the creation of nonpolity spaces, and doing so would make it easier for groups of
people to secede by giving them the space they need, this would
merely be a knock-on benefit flowing from the primary right. The
primary right protects the right of individuals to leave even those
new polities and is therefore distinct from the right to secede.
Note that the primary right also places a correlative duty on
the right-holder, in a state of non-polity, not to influence others.
In other words, the right goes both ways. This means that the
right would require persons capable of practicing relative
noninterference.
C. Differentiating the Primary Right from Traditional
Exit Rights
The primary right differs from traditional conceptions of exit
rights in at least five ways. First, as discussed, the literature on
exit rights has focused on the act of choosing among polities,
rather than the choice of no polity at all. Second, proponents of
exit rights tend to base the right almost exclusively on what I
have called above the failed form of autonomy, subjective
preference, which is antithetical to the form of autonomy, bare
autonomy, which is protected by the primary right.58 Third, exit
rights tend also to be seen as held by individuals against the
state, whereas it is other persons generally that threaten the

58. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 433, 444-45 (2002) (“[T]his personal right of exit is a negative freedom in
the sense that the right itself is indifferent in principle to the uses to which it is
put.”).
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conditions that the primary right protects. Fourth, exit rights are
usually argued from highly abstract political, economic, and/or
cultural perspectives, rather than in terms of the literally
physical and empirically demonstrable non-human and nonpolity
world we call wilderness and to which the primary right refers.59
Fifth, while the realist critique that exit is infeasible poses a
significant threat to the cogency of traditional exit rights,60 it
actually works in favor of the normative primary right. Consider
Christopher Eisgruber’s argument that the right to refuse to
allow outsiders into a given polity seriously undermines the
validity of the “choice” to remain in or exit from one’s own polity,
thereby posing a significant challenge to traditional exit theory:
[The] Consent Principle ignores the consent of the excluded. In a
world without scarcity, that omission might be excusable. We
might imagine individuals banding together voluntarily in a
Lockean wilderness, free to take what they wanted so long as
they honored the Lockean proviso’s instruction to leave ‘enough
and as good . . . for others.’ In such a world, I could not object if
you refused to admit me into your society. You could demand that
I find friends of my own and form another society elsewhere - and
the demand that I go elsewhere would not be onerous since, by
hypothesis, elsewhere would be ‘enough and as good’ as what you
have. But ours is a world of scarcity; after Americans claim their
nation’s bounty, there is not ‘enough and as good’ left for the rest
of humanity. When we exclude others, they do have reason to
complain.61

In contrast to traditional exit rights, Eisgruber’s argument
actually supports a primary right claim because the difficulty of
exit acts as a reason that we ought to protect and further the
primary right. The sort of scarcity Eisgruber refers to is not an
inevitable condition. Rather, both the difficulty of leaving one’s
own society and the limitations on places one can go are the
59. See Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 753, 783
(2000) (arguing in favor of one’s right to exit by opting out of paying taxes for
and receiving the benefits of particular state programs).
60. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private
Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 165 (2003).
61. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 54, 68 (1997).
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product of a failure to protect the in vacuis locis that the primary
right demands.
III.

The Primary Right Requires Access to
Wilderness

A. The “State Of Nature” Is a Literal Wilderness
That we ought to be able to withdraw consent and leave
polities, and that we might call that right primary in some sense
is not particularly exciting. But, if we accept that autonomy and
meaningful consent require an option to exit all polities, we must
consider how that option is realized. How can an individual walk
away from one polity without joining any other system of rights
or duties? Must one go to sea to establish new political
communities, as modern day “seasteaders” suggest?62 What
would prevent states from eventually extending their borders
seaward to prevent that? In answering this question – which,
until now, has remained largely unaddressed in our literature –
we find a connection between the quote from Thoreau at the very
beginning of this essay, Locke’s ideas about consent, and
Rousseau’s primitive contract; that connection lies in what may
be called nature, non-polity, or the non-human world.
Liberalism draws its origins from Locke’s conceptual model
describing the shift from the state of nature to governed states.
Yet, despite the glaring presence of the concept of nature (a space
that is not merely pre-government, but also pre-political) in that
model, liberalism has failed to recognize the distinction Thoreau
saw between “absolute freedom and wildness, as contrasted with
a freedom and culture merely civil.”63 In this section, I will argue
that for Locke, nature or wilderness was an essential component
of consent which legitimated polities, or the exercise of power. It
constituted the preexisting default backdrop, or primary state of
affairs, against which inter-personal relations were structured.
For Locke, the option to exit, or to withhold consent, was realized
in the existence of a state of nature – a literal, physical space in
the natural world: wilderness.
62. See THE SEASTEADING INSTITUTE, supra note 6.
63. Thoreau, supra note 1.

23

2012]

THE PRIMARY RIGHT

883

Locke describes the state of nature for persons as “a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their
possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of
the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the
will of any other man.”64 It was a place “free and unpossessed”65
in which there were few others to compete with for the “vast
[w]ilderness of the [e]arth.”66 Locke writes, “there could be then
little room for [q]uarrels or [c]ontentions about [p]roperty so
establish[e]d. . . . Nor was this appropriation . . . any prejudice to
any other [m]an, since there was still enough, and as good left;
and more than the as yet unprovided could use.”67 Most
significantly, he writes that in the original state of nature the act
of social compact was one which “any number of men may do
because it injures not the [f]reedom of the rest; they are left as
they were in the [l]iberty of the [s]tate of [n]ature.”68
The existence of a “residual state of nature”69 was clearly a
necessary condition for the social compact to be legitimately
based on consent. Only because individuals had the option not to
join the social compact, could individuals be bound by the social
compact without its infringing upon their autonomy. Thus, we
can reasonably infer that Locke’s theory of political authority
presumes a right to completely exit all polities.70 The residual
state of nature is wilderness, and without it social compacts
cannot be the product of consent, and become illegitimate.
This interpretation is supported by Locke’s writings about
America and by the tradition of thought taken up by the Framers
to justify declaring independence and to distinguish their conduct
from acts of treason – i.e., the mutinous overthrow of the
government – against England. Locke saw America, in all its

64. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
1980) (emphasis added).
65. LOCKE, supra note 35, ¶ 121.
66. Id. ¶ 36.
67. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33 (emphasis added).
68. Id. ¶ 95.
69. See Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 42-44 (2007).
70. Id.
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wildness, as a “second Garden of Eden,”71 arguably synonymous
with, or at least close to, a residual state of nature. It seems
reasonable that if Locke’s conception of the state of nature had
nothing to do with wilderness and could just as easily be achieved
by the dissolution of a government in Europe, he would not have
made the distinction between America and Europe. Locke’s state
of nature was a physical, rather than an exclusively juridical,
concept that was virtually synonymous with the absence of other
persons’ control and influence.72 The fact that he saw America as
empty (rightly or wrongly) obviously mattered to him.
The Framers relied heavily on Locke’s ideas,73 asserting
their right under the laws of nature to declare independence.
Inspired by Locke’s promise of a land “free and unpossessed,”
they assumed “among the powers of the earth, the separate and
equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God
entitle them,” in order to “institute new Government.”74 Clearly,
the Framers read in Locke’s theory a right to return to the state
of nature, to opt out of existing political systems, rather than a
right merely to join some then-existing polity other than England.
It was central to justifying their act of constituting a legitimate
new government that they viewed the New World as essentially
in vacuis locis, where they were under Natural Law and from
which they could opt into a new social compact.
Whether the Framers respected the possibility of humans’
autonomy from each other enough to preserve the non-human
world or not is irrelevant. The point is that they actually
practiced something very much like the right. They did so, but
without the safeguards and the correct structure of rights and
duties to ensure that others in the future could do the same, and
perhaps a better job of it.

71. BARBARA ARNEIL, JOHN LOCKE AND AMERICA: THE DEFENCE OF ENGLISH
COLONIALISM 72, 110-11 (1996).
72. See generally Dillard, supra note 69.
73. Edward S. Corwin, The ‘Higher Law’ Background of American
Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 365, 383 (1929) (“The conveyance of
natural law ideas into American constitutional theory was the work
preeminently – though by no means exclusively – of John Locke's Second
Treatise on Civil Government . . . .”).
74. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 2 (U.S. 1776).
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Regardless, it is clear, first, that Locke envisioned that some
would consent to the compact while others might not, instead
choosing to remain in a state of nature, to literally remain in the
natural world outside all human polities; and, two, that Lockean
consent requires, therefore, the option to remain in the state of
nature. More specifically, Lockean consent requires the option to
remain in, or return to, the wilderness.
But somehow in the hundreds of years over which Locke’s
state of nature model has been developed and built upon,
liberalism has obscured the connection between meaningful
consent to be governed and nature in the sense of the non-human
natural world, or wilderness. Nature, as it appears in the concept
“state of nature,” always seems to remain an abstract component
for theorists. It became and remains synonymous with an
abstract original condition:
For Locke, Kant, and Rawls, not only is the state of nature
primary, in the sense of coming first in order either historically
or conceptually, but conclusions derived from it are also primary,
in the sense of coming first in predominance. Or, as Dworkin
would have it, institutions, and ideas that come later in order
than those derived from the abstract original condition are
always to be tested against, subjected to, and vulnerable to being
‘trumped’ by the principles derived from the abstract original
condition.75

Why should the “state of nature” be reduced to an “abstract
original condition?” The physical, primitive, non-human world –
or what we call wilderness – seems like the antithesis of abstract.
Nature is certainly less abstract than things like the social
compact, human institutions, and law itself. Again, wilderness is
the physical manifestation of the original condition, the
possibility of being able to break off from other persons and
become autonomous (singular) because one is not hopelessly
surrounded by them. Isn’t it reasonable that “the state of nature”
means exactly what it says and that it refers to a moment in
human development when the natural world dominated humans

75. Peter Stillman, Hegel's Analysis of Property in The Philosophy of Right,
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1038-39 (1989).
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and controlled the human condition no less than for any other
species?
Where else but the non-human world or wilderness can one
be free from what Locke called the “Will of any other Man”
including the changes others make and influences they have upon
the world? Is real property the best version of nature and the
non-human that liberalism can offer us, so that wilderness is
reduced to one’s backyard? And if nature, as used in the “state of
nature,” means not just the absence of particular juridical human
relations, but also the literal presence of wilderness rather than
civilizing influence of man, what does that mean for liberalism’s
principle that humans ought to be able to walk away, to be let
alone and autonomous, by refusing to consent to the control and
influence of others? Polities are meant to give humans the
benefits they cannot get in the wilderness, not take away the
benefits they had in wilderness by eradicating it.
B. Defining Wilderness
For the purposes of this essay, it is most useful to conceive of
wilderness as a physical space absent of human power, control,
and influence, or an objective backdrop free of human
subjectivity. Here we have to be careful to avoid what I will call
the “territory trap,” or the learned inclination to see physical and
juridical space as a defined territory surrounded by other defined
territories. Moving what remains of wilderness into such a
territory would entail significant human influence, in
contravention of the right. Rather, limited human polities must
form in, and be surrounded by, the backdrop or default of
wilderness. Non-polity is the space between. That is the only
way the right works, and reasonable access to something at least
approaching the ideal of the non-human world is ensured. It is
not unlike the world today, with human polities divided by oceans
that are, or until the past several decades were, largely nonhuman.
Such an approach comports not only with Locke’s ideas about
the state of nature, but also with more modern views and uses of
the term. The Wilderness Act of 1964 and its precursors draw
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their theoretical origins from the wilderness movement, a social
movement that strove towards “liberal perfectionism”76 and
conceived of wilderness as an “environment of solitude.”77
Wilderness initially received legal protection in the 1920’s under
a Forest Service regulation creating and setting aside certain
“primitive areas.”78
But the Wilderness Act of 1964 goes further in stating that
the express purpose of the Act is “to assure that an increasing
population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing
mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within the
United States . . . .”79 Toward that end, it finds that “[a]
wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area
where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by
man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.”80 The
definition is further refined later in the Act to describe land
“retaining its primeval character and influence,”81 affected
“primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work
substantially unnoticeable,”82 and which “has outstanding
opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of
recreation.”83 Similarly, the Endangered Species Act’s primary
purposes are to “provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such
endangered species and threatened species.”84
Significantly, the Wilderness Act does not require wilderness
to be a space absolutely devoid of humanity. The Act expressly
recognizes that wilderness areas must be managed and
presupposes that wilderness areas exist within the jurisdiction of
76. Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Returning Democracy to
Environmental Law, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1161 (2010).
77. Id. at 1165.
78. Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62, 71
(2010).
79. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2006).
80. Id. § 1131(c).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Endangered Species Act § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).
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a given polity. Likewise, the Endangered Species Act provides for
the careful management and conservation of species within a
polity, not unfettered access to complete biodiversity and its
sufficient natural habitat. I am not suggesting that either the
Wilderness or the Endangered Species Acts enshrine the primary
right – that would be an odd assertion in light of what I have said
about the antecedent nature of the right. Rather, like the Court’s
use of the concept of privacy, I suggest that with these Acts,
Congress recognized a spectrum of human control and influence
on the non-human world and the value of creating duties on
others to ensure access to places and species under relatively
little human control and influence.
C. The Primary Right Is Not So Special After All:
Positive Law, Like The Primary Right, Protects
Wilderness
We can define the particular duties created by the primary
right, keeping in mind that, like all general statements of rights
out of the context in which they are applied, the description is
merely a placeholder. This is especially true of the primary right,
where properly balancing it against competing interests will
involve empirical analyses across many disciplines. Regardless,
we can initially think of the primary right as an individual’s
general claim-right to duties of noninterference by others with (1)
the rightholders’ reasonable access to wilderness, as well as (2)
access to complete biodiversity and its sufficient natural
habitat.85 The right is paired with the same dual correlative
duties on the rightholder not to influence others. The latter duty
preserves the biodiversity of the non-human world, wilderness
writ large;86 the former preserves its local representation. The
duty to not interfere with reasonable access allows persons the
“genuine alternative choice” that Dworkin refers to above,87
allowing meaningful consent to the polity they are in. Together,
these related duties protect the necessary conditions and the

85. See supra Part III.
86. By “writ large” I mean the wilderness or nonhuman as it exists
throughout the world as opposed to locally or in one place.
87. Dworkin, supra note 45.
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tangible places and things, which make the act of consent to
polities of persons possible, because one cannot consent to other
persons’ influence and control if no alternative exists. The right
involves many more Hohfeldian relations88 that will not be
discussed here.
These duties (which work in favor of one another, with access
promoting the creation of wilderness and vice versa) break up a
more general duty not to interfere with access to the non-human
world, ensuring the possibility of exit from all polities and thus
places from which to consent to human power, control, and
influence. What then is the non-human world in a world filled
with billions of humans? Presumably, since the word human
generally refers to our species, the term “non-human” refers to all
other species in existence, and the term “world” refers to the
physical locations in which they live, or their natural habitats
(this is, incidentally, the general approach taken in the
Endangered Species Act). So, to preserve access to the nonhuman world requires preservation of non-human species and
their habitats.
Why must the biodiversity be complete?
Remember how the concept “wilderness” works in the primary
right – it is in part a theoretical ideal but also refers to actual
places in the world, much the way free speech is an ideal but also
refers to the actual speech that is permitted once the ideal is
balanced against other values, like national security. The ideal of
wilderness in the primary right is the far end of the spectrum of
human influence, an ideal which makes thinking about how one
place is more wild than another possible. The ideal is the
complete non-human world, or complete biodiversity and its
sufficient natural habitat, but that ideal is then balanced against
the human polities in that world, much like the ideal of free
speech is balanced against the ideal of national security. Each
must make room for the other. Again, the picture that will
emerge then is not a state called Wilderness, to which all of the
non-human world has been relegated, but polities in a sea of
wilderness, islands of consensual human political association in a
sea of non-polity.
88. Regarding the constituent elements of legal rights generally, see Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 65 (1923).
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Another way to think of rights as ideals is to consider how we
compensate persons whose rights have been violated. It is
physically impossible to restore a person who has been tortured to
the state of affairs they were in before the torture. But we use
that theoretical state of affairs, or alternatively the state of
affairs they would have been in had they not been tortured, as an
ideal when determining how they are to be compensated for the
violation of their right not to be tortured. The same can be done
with the primary right – we can use an ideal non-human world to
practically reason in that direction.
It is vital to see that we currently live under positive legal
duties, backed by force, that point towards something like the
norm I am calling the primary right. Wilderness, as used in the
Wilderness Act of 1964, required that wilderness areas be
“administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people
in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and
enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of
these areas.”89 Both it and the Endangered Species Act are
enforceable, under penalty, by federal agencies.90
Analogues to these duties exist in international law.
Instruments such as the Convention Concerning the Protection of
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the Convention on
Biological Diversity, the Stockholm Declaration of the United
Nations on the Human Environment, the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, the Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, among others, seek to
protect the non-human world.91
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2006).
90. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531—44 (2006); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131—1136
(2006).
91. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, pmbl., Jan. 5, 1992, 1960
U.N.T.S. 1087 (“[C]onservation of biological diversity is a common concern of
humankind . . . .”); U.N. Envtl. Programme, Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503;
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, pmbl., Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 (“Recognizing that wild fauna and
flora in their many beautiful and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the
natural systems of the earth which must be protected for this and the
generations to come . . . .”); Convention for the Protection and Preservation of

31

2012]

THE PRIMARY RIGHT

891

To be clear, while there are duties imposed on us by positive
law that parallel the core duties that make up the primary right
(and other areas of law we would not immediately think of and
which will not be discussed here, like the common law of false
imprisonment), the primary right – like other fundamental
human rights – need not rely on positive law. The primary right
provides a theoretical basis for and explains positive law norms,
and its reflection in positive law is evidence of the right.
However, the right is not contingent on positive law. The state
cannot give that which comes before it. Whether it was the
Framers seeing themselves as having found a state of nature in
which to form a new polity, or wilderness advocates creating
primitive spaces away from others, both represent moves along
the same spectrum. The far end of that spectrum would be the
total absence of human control and influence, and that concept –
even if theoretical – acts as a point from which to measure,
whether we are measuring the imposition of a noisy road in
woods we occupy, or the threat of foreign soldiers crossing our
border to enforce a tax. Without that point we have no absolute
from which to measure the degree to which others control and
influence us – a frightening prospect if one values the bare
autonomy of being “let alone,” the value of complete exit from all
polities. Wilderness, or the ideal of the far end of the spectrum
(as opposed to federal wilderness areas or the Framers’ America)
is thus the value – part and parcel of consent – at the base of the
primary right.

the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, pmbl., Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37
(“Considering that deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or
natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the
nations of the world”); Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, pmbl., Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354
(“Wishing to protect and preserve scenery of extraordinary beauty, unusual and
striking geologic formations, regions and natural objects of aesthetic, historic or
scientific value, and areas characterized by primitive conditions.”).
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THE PRIMARY RIGHT IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW THEORY

A. Linking Liberal Political Exit Theory and
Normative Environmental Law Theory
To date, the fields of liberal political exit theory and
normative environmental law theory (if not environmental ethics
more generally), have remained essentially separate. It is true
that others have posited forms of complete exit. For example,
Abner Greene refers to “complete exit” when discussing the
withdrawal of religious communities like the Amish.92 Perhaps
Nicolaus Tideman makes the argument closest to mine in his
article Secession as a Human Right,93 which derives a compelling
argument for a right to secede from the premise that people have
rights to themselves. However, none of these arguments ground
the right in wilderness or bare autonomy, instead connecting the
right to environmental ethics.
It is also true that environmental law theory has gone so far
as to assert that wilderness can further human freedom, but it
has not treated such freedom as a form of autonomy that grounds
a first generation human right. Rather, the approach has relied
on instrumentalist and utilitarian arguments to support the
claim. For example, James Huffman and others have explored
the direct relationship between the concepts of freedom and
wilderness,94 but their arguments are premised upon a particular
political system (e.g. the United States) and seem to proceed from
essentially instrumentalist claims for protecting wilderness:
wilderness should be protected because its continued existence
facilitates particular values other than bare autonomy and
consent to political association, be it the failed form of autonomy
(loss of wilderness narrows the total range of human choices),95
92. Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes about Equality, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996).
93. See generally Nicolaus Tideman, Secession as a Human Right, 1 J. MORAL
PHIL. 19 (2004).
94. See James Huffman, Wilderness and Freedom, 16 IDAHO L. REV. 407
(1980).
95. See Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1326-27 (1974); Shea
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equal protection,96 or the First Amendment.97 Indeed, the
relationship between wilderness and freedom has been so
“instrumentalized” as to suggest that it can be quantified and
traded in a market system.98 Such arguments can be problematic
because they often view liberal principles as competing against
wilderness values, or because they are based on the rights of
future generations.99
Moreover, where environmental ethics and human rights
have intersected, the claim is to a very different human right
than the one advanced here: a right to an environment adequate
to human health and well-being, or a clean and safe
environment.100 Other attempts to articulate a human right to
the environment also usually sound in the area of so-called
“second generation rights,” which are less accepted as “rights” to
begin with than civil and political rights, and which are valued
progressively rather than absolutely, making these claims weaker
tools for environmental law than the primary right.
By linking environmental ethics and political exit theory, the
primary right can help environmental scholars facing the
difficulty of finding an objective theoretical foundation or baseline
for protecting the environment – but using the primary right in
this sense will not go without criticism. A. Dan Tarlock has

Coulson, Liberty, Property, and the Environment: Rethinking Environmental
Law in Canada, 26 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 49, 65-67 (2009).
96. See A. Dan Tarlock, A Wilderness. Bill of Rights, by William O. Douglas,
19 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1967) (book review).
97. Scholars who see the First Amendment as a source for environmental
protection espouse, for example, the value of “an understanding of the true
relationship between man and nature.” See Carole Gallagher, The Movement to
Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107 (1997).
98. See generally Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Gamble, The Problem with
Wilderness, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 503 (2008); PARTHA DASGUPTA, HUMAN
WELL-BEING AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT (2004).
99. See, e.g., Martin Schonfeld, Population Growth and the Preservation of
Wilderness, 31 J. SOC. PHIL. 414, 414-28 (2001).
100. See, e.g., James Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment:
Philosophical Perspectives on its Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 281
(2003); TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 1 (2005); Luis E.
Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under
International Law? It Depends on the Source, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
1, 19 (2001).
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argued that environmental law is incompatible with our U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence because the environment, rather
than human dignity, is the focal point of environmental
protection, and because environmental regulation calls for
affirmative state action (positive rights) rather than preventing
state oppression (negative rights).101
Kent Greenawalt goes further, arguing that a religious or
non-rational basis is needed to support environmental protection
because:
[u]nless one puts the justification in terms of psychological health
or in terms of a needed corrective to present human ignorance of
future possibilities, the claim that people should respect nature
in its own right and should try to preserve species is not one that
can be grounded successfully in rational argument.102

In arguing that a non-rational or religious foundation is
appropriate, Greenawalt asks:
If crushing one stone raises no moral question, why does
destroying the Grand Canyon raise a question except in terms of
aesthetic and other losses to people and to other creatures
warranting moral consideration? Why should the life of one
nearly extinct snail darter count for more than the life of one
salmon, if the salmon’s capacities are at least as great?103

There have been many attempts to circumvent this problem.
With regard to wilderness areas, some have argued for assigning
property rights to wilderness areas, which could then be traded in
the market.104 Jedediah Purdy has attempted to revise our
conventional approach to environmental law without resorting to
market solutions by arguing that our historic discourse about the

101. See A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 223-26 (2004).
102. Kent Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious
Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1011, 1039 (1986).
103. Id. at 1037.
104. Laitos & Gamble, supra note 98.
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value of protecting the environment is sufficient to generate
democratic change.105
In contrast to these, the primary right approach claims
access to wilderness and its local representation as an objective
human right (or meta-human right, as described above),
irrespective of subjective market preference or the democratic
process. The basis for the right is not religion, but the value of
autonomy that can exist only through the uniquely objective
concept of wilderness. Wilderness is not an instrument for
autonomy; rather, it is the physical realization of the entirely
secular value of bare autonomy and meaningful consent, which
are purely rational, liberal, and political values. Wilderness must
be preserved because without it one could not revoke one’s
consent to be subjected to others’ influence. To respond to
Tarlock’s point, what value is more central to human dignity than
autonomy – the ability and praxis of declining other persons’
control and influence in order to self-determine? And why would
I care if the persons forcing themselves on me are representatives
of the state or fellow citizens? It is the imposition of power or
polity that matters, not who is imposing.106
Furthermore, to Greenawalt’s point, destroying the Grand
Canyon raises more of a question than crushing a stone because
of the great degree of influence the act would have on the nonhuman world and thus persons right to leave all polities and
access it. That is why climate change is so offensive to those who
love wilderness – it represents such a loss of bare autonomy in a
world from which we can exercise the possibility of consent to
influence by others, or to instead be let alone.
Thinking along these lines may give the best reasons to
justify things like the September 10, 2008 acquittal of six
Greenpeace activists charged with intentionally damaging the

105. Purdy, supra note 76.
106. Alternatively, we can evade the state versus private actor distinction by
noting that the state has monopolized the right to use the violence we would
otherwise use against the offending private actors, and therefore become
complicit.
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UK coal-fired power station at Kingsnorth.107 While the jury may
have been persuaded by the defense’s arguments about the
activists’ preventing the greater harm to property caused by
climate change, a better moral justification might have been that
the operators of the plant had crossed a theoretical threshold and
were violating the primary right.
B. Solving Environmental Law Theory: Of Baselines
and Wilderness
By now it should be obvious that a strong candidate for a
baseline of environmental regulation is the background
environment itself, both the one in which humans occupy, and the
non-human world. But, where on the continuum of human
power, control and influence, do we draw the boundaries of the
primary right? As with any right, bright-line boundaries are
difficult to establish in the abstract. That said, I suggest we can
draw a line around that which is reasonably necessary to
preserve an exit option out of human polities and into the
wilderness. This requires at least two things: preventing the loss
of other species in their natural habitat with whom one can
interact (especially as those species evolve), and ensuring that
access to local wilderness areas is at least reasonable (for
example, reachable by a short drive). This would allow persons
who do not consent to the dominant influence of other persons to
exit, while allowing for all the other forms of human activity we
find valuable. Again, unlike Purdy’s approach, the primary right
approach treats the imperative to preserve and restore wilderness
as an objective fact of human autonomy, not subject to the
opinions of others in political or economic markets.
The one variable that might make reasonable access to
wilderness impossible, human population, would of course have to
be taken into account. While it is often unclear what one means
by overpopulation (begging the question over what), the primary
right provides a useful standard: again, do you, at this moment,
as you read these lines, have reasonable access to the nonhuman
107. See John Vidal, Climb Every Chimney, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 12, 2008,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/12/activists.
kingsnorth.
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world? We can easily speculate how much easier the right would
be to protect and further, for all of us, had human population not
sextupled in the Twentieth century alone. That said, the fact
that the primary right may not be fully realized because of
human population levels does not make the imperative to strive
for the ideal any less absolute. According to Daniel Farber, “most
constitutional rights represent baselines that are subject to
override, but only by particularly powerful government interests.
For example, the First Amendment does not create an absolute
right, but the norm of free speech nonetheless functions as a
powerful baseline.”108 The norm, or ideal, of free speech that
Farber describes is the theoretical point from which claims to a
right to free speech are launched, and from which fulfillment of
the right is measured. In the same way, wilderness is the norm,
or ideal, from which claims to the primary right are launched,
and from which fulfillment of the right is measured.
Farber critiques Cass Sunstein’s use of a neutral baseline in
evaluating environmental regulation. Sunstein objects to the
idea that “the interest in clean air and water, and in a safe
workplace, should be seen as a ‘right’ in the sense of something
that will not be balanced against other social interests.”109
Instead, for Sunstein there is no presumptive allocation of
entitlements, and individual interests in polluting or preserving
the environment are weighed equally. Farber analogizes this
approach to Ronald Coase’s objection “to the notion that someone
making an intrusive noise should be seen as invading the rights
of a neighbor; the neighbor can equally well be seen to be
invading the noisemaker’s rights by demanding quiet.”110 Farber
asserts that Sunstein’s neutral baseline for evaluating
environmental law flies in the face of “the two primary interests
deserving of protection” that Sunstein himself identifies: human
welfare and autonomy.111 Farber points out, “someone who has
developed cancer, as a result of involuntary environmental

108. Daniel Farber, Playing the Baseline: Civil Rights, Environmental Law,
and Statutory Interpretation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 676, 685 (1991).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 686.
111. Id. at 687.
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exposure, has also suffered very serious losses of welfare and
autonomy.”112
Contrast Sunstein’s approach with the primary right
approach. Using the norm of reasonable access to wilderness
(defined to require complete biodiversity and its sufficient natural
habitat) as a baseline, the primary right would guide many
regulatory outcomes for air and water quality, especially where
the behavior at issue has global impacts, like carbon emissions,
upon the litmus paper represented by wilderness. Similarly, the
primary right would favor the sounds in wilderness over Coase’s
noisemaker, an advertiser wishing to blast commercials via
loudspeakers into the Gila Wilderness for example. In other
words, hikers trump snowmobilers.
And yet, the primary right approach also has the advantage
of being truly neutral. Unlike Sunstein and Coase’s seemingly
neutral system, the primary right uses the non-subjective nonhuman world as a starting point. Even using regulatory,
statutory, or constitutional baselines, as Sunstein does elsewhere,
seems arbitrarily subjective (favoring one group over another)
relative to the immaculate pre-human neutrality of wilderness.
In a world of competition between various subjective uses of
scarce resources, non-use is more equitable than any particular
use because it is the only choice that avoids favoring one human
over another, by instead linking the decision to and favoring the
non-human, or that which came before the various subjective
uses. The fact that non-use may coincide with some humans’
preference is irrelevant – the decision is based on the original
state of the resources. Like an adult settling a dispute between
children over a piece of cake, it really is a fair choice to say that
none may have it.
Consider in this regard the common debate over whether
wilderness and the non-human world ought to be valued
instrumentally or intrinsically. The primary right allows us to
exit the “intrinsic versus instrumental” debate by providing a
unique, third way of valuing wilderness, seeing it as “objectively
valuable.” Wilderness is objective not just in the sense that we
can objectively verify human influence in the non-human world,
112. Id.
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or even in the sense that wilderness has objectively intrinsic or
instrumental value, but in the sense that wilderness or any other
natural resource is an object with the potential to be converted to
any number of uses, each subjectively valuable to different groups
of humans users.113 The default state of the world, however, is
unconverted, natural wilderness. An unused natural resource, a
nonpolity, or a place in a state of wilderness, is thus objective or
neutral, relative to the various subjective uses to which it could
be put. In this sense wilderness is “objectively valuable” because
it has not been reduced to a subjective use. When we alter the
non-human we are not just dominating it, but dominating others
who might have appreciated its objective state.
C. Dividing Environmental from Non-Human Law
Much of the confusion described above could be attributed to
simple semantics. Interior decorators use the term
“environment,” but it hardly seems fitting to treat the
preservation of species and their habitats in the same vein as
where we place rugs and light fixtures. We might therefore call
the creation of a manicured park, which seems to be at best a
Platonic imitation of the non-human world, an improvement in
the environment. But by calling the regulation of humans with
the non-human world “environmental law,” we immediately treat
the world as a singular environment and erase the human and
nonhuman divide – conceptually erasing the non-human world,
the world before humans, entirely. It becomes “ours,” the
presumed consenters’, communal environment to treat. As
discussed below, this is a convenient frame for polluters and
tends to make invisible key factors that degrade the non-human
world like population growth. Changing the frame to non-human
law preserves, in the term itself, the subject of the law’s
protection.

113. Obviously, non-human animals use natural resources. However, they
will not be discussed here, primarily because non-human animals are generally
not seen as capable of creating social contracts.
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COUNTERARGUMENTS AND FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS

Some will claim that the primary right is not something
people want – that it is not preferred enough over conflicting
interests to survive market choices and the democratic process.
But the claim that the primary right ought to be respected is a
thoroughly first generation (political) human rights argument for
protecting the non-human world. The rights-based argument is
premised upon the intrinsic worth of autonomy and consent, and
the wilderness that is necessary to protect these values. It posits
that autonomy is a non-commensurable value that trumps
subjective preference, instrumental value, and the maximization
of utility. As such, just as the right to vote is not contingent on
what the majority thinks or people actually voting, the primary
right is not defeated by counterarguments about personal
preference.
Modern authority has breezed past the requirements of the
primary right so much so that the claims made herein will appear
fantastical to the average thinker, more than some minds (the
sort that believe in “green consumption”) can take in as
Tocqueville wrote of early Americans:
To break through almost impenetrable forests, to cross deep
rivers, to brave pestilential marshes . . . those are exertions that
the American readily contemplates, if it is a question of earning a
guinea; for that is the point. But that one should do such things
from curiosity is more than his mind can take in.114

Many persons simply do not have the disposition or capacity
to respect particular rights.115 They must assert their will upon
the world and cannot simply let others alone. We should not
expect them to do so. That is the whole point – I need not expect
114. Purdy, supra note 76, at 1140 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO
AMERICA 335 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 1962) (1959)).
115. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 89, at 1021-22 (“[P]erhaps only human
beings with a minimal level of moral capacity . . . may qualify as bearers of
rights who are owed justice.”). The author continues by stating, “Moreover, an
attitude that animals and nature are not to be dominated contributes to less
domineering and aggressive attitudes among people and thus enhances human
social existence.” Id. at 1024.
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them to cease from asserting their will on me or others, or feel the
need to waste my time convincing them to do so, because I need
not deal with them at all. I should be able to walk away from
them and their influence, making them irrelevant without
relation to me. Their incapacity, their inability to practice
relative noninterference, does not defeat the right. The rightsbased argument treats the value upon which the right is based,
autonomy, as a non-commensurable liberal value that trumps
subjective preference and the maximization of total utility.
That said, the primary right is not simply an attempt to hoist
libertarians opposed to environmental protections on their own
petard, nor to work a reductio on liberal political thought, nor to
default to the remaining generation of human rights argument,
by claiming that second and third generation arguments for the
natural environment have largely failed (especially in light of our
inability to regulate anthropogenic causes of climate change).
Rather, it is an honest attempt to explore the meanings and
limits of autonomy and consent, proceeding from a human rights
framework of assumptions.
There would no doubt be desirable consequences in
protecting the right, relevant to climate change, urban sprawl,
the loss of species, and the spread of toxins; this would also
include social changes, not the least of which would be how
thoughtful persons come about bringing others into the world.
Further, it seems obvious that any collection of political systems
will produce more utility if the polities within it are incentivized
to attract members rather than compel their membership because
no real alternatives exist. Nevertheless, the arguments made
herein spring from the intrinsic value of autonomy and consent,
rather than the usefulness or instrumental value of having the
right. As such, the primary right is not particularly vulnerable to
speculative counterarguments about the dangerous consequences
of recognizing such a right, such as effects on economies.
Another argument against the claims made herein is that
realizing anything close to the primary right for all persons is
simply infeasible. This argument fails because it often presumes
that the voluntary behavior most responsible for preventing
access to the non-human world, the creation of humans or
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unlimited human procreation, is somehow inevitable, like rain
falling from the sky. That is not the way having children works.
The comeback then is usually that while limitless procreation
may not be physically inevitable, the primary right remains
infeasible because there is a personal, limitless right to procreate.
This too fails because the primary right trumps any so-called
unlimited right to procreate, a claim of right that is doomed to
failure, both legally and morally.116 The primary right is feasible
because of that trump, because the value it protects outweighs
the only conflicting value it has to in order to be feasible in a
logical ordering of rights and duties.
Note that the primary right is in a way superior to other
human rights and interests in that it is tied to a concretely
tangible and objectively valuable thing – wilderness – rather than
relatively abstract concepts like religion, privacy, or free speech.
We can empirically measure the degree to which wilderness is
lost, and the degree to which we have access to it, and hence the
status of the right. In this way it is a right built for praxis: the
reader can decide now whether, and when, she or he will go
experience the value, and where they will do it; she or he can also
imagine what it would be like to live in a world where they could
not do it, could not get away from others. Again, do you, at this
moment, as you read these lines, have reasonable access to the
non-human world? Because it corresponds to our experiences,
you, the reader, can visualize it much more than you can
visualize whether you enjoy other and more contingent
116. See Dillard, supra note 64; Carter Dillard, Valuing Having Children, 12
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 151 (2010) (exploring self-replacement as the only defensible
objective value underlying the moral right to procreate); Carter Dillard, Child
Welfare and Future Persons, 43 GA. L. REV. 367 (2009) (demonstrating the moral
and legal duty a prospective parent has to be fit when he or she has a child, a
duty arising from or creating correlative claim-rights shared by the state and
prospective children); Carter Dillard, Prospective Parents and the Children's
Rights Convention, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 485 (2010) (interpreting the
Convention from a prospective-child-centered perspective, and exploring
whether the Convention requires states to pursue policies that heighten
prospective parents' perceptions of the duties they owe their prospective
children before having them); Carter Dillard, Future Children as Property, 17
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 47 (2010) (arguing that the broad, modern, privacybased version of the right to procreate is in tension with an embedded
constitutional principle that prohibits one class of persons (prospective parents)
from treating another (prospective children) as property).
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fundamental rights, like the right to counsel, to speak freely, or to
be free of unlawful searches and seizures.
Contrast this with the praxis of the right to have as many
children as you like, in whatever circumstances you wish: what
concretely tangible and objectively valuable thing was Nadya
Suleman, the so-called “Octomom,” pursuing by having fourteen
children?117 Autonomy and privacy? Was whatever valuable
thing she sought more valuable than those aspects of the nonhuman world that inspired our greatest works of art, poetry, and
literature? In contrast to more ethereal rights, the primary right
is built upon the concrete and objectively valuable ideal of
reasonable access to the non-human world. I would rather share
the world with spotted owls than the Duggars’ umpteen
children,118 and, per the primary right, I have a right to do so.
Thus, even though traditional environmental regulation has
been derided as hopelessly anti-liberal, negative, and contrary to
human dignity, the primary right is the opposite – encouraging
and urging persons to exercise their autonomy from each other in
order to experience the non-human world, and thus incentivizing
polities to attract rather than compel membership. If we honestly
value polities created by consent then we value a world
dominated by the natural spaces in between those polities,
because those spaces give meaning to our active consent, our act
of choosing.
Perhaps the best challenge to the claim that non-polity or
wilderness can act as a baseline for a human right, and for
environmental regulation, is the assertion that wilderness simply
does not exist, that any divide between the human and nonhuman worlds is so obscure as to make wilderness an incoherent
concept.119 William Cronon might be seen as taking this position
in his famous essay, The Trouble With Wilderness.120 More than
117. See Ashley Surdin, Octuplet Mother Also Gives Birth to Ethical Debate,
WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2009, at C1.
118. See generally JIM BOB DUGGAR & MICHELLE DUGGAR, THE DUGGARS: 20 &
COUNTING! RAISING ONE OF AMERICA’S LARGEST FAMILIES – HOW THEY DO IT
(2008).
119. See, e.g., EMMA MARRIS, RAMBUNCTIOUS GARDEN: SAVING NATURE IN A
POST-WILD WORLD (2011).
120. See William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the
Wrong Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: TOWARD REINVENTING NATURE 69
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one commentator has criticized environmentalists’ attachment to
the human and non-human divide,121 calling the “wild” an “empty
concept” and arguing that “[h]uman domination of earth’s
ecosystems empties most of the meaning out of the concept of
‘wild’ today.”122 They assert that wilderness is a profoundly
subjective aesthetic, rather than objectively verifiable state of
affairs.123 Others attack the divide as a social construct that
distorts our view of reality and preserves legal doctrines, like the
“Act of God” doctrine, that now make little sense, especially in
light of anthropogenic climate change.124
There is a suspicious undercurrent of hostility towards those
who would protect the non-human from the human in these
critiques, and one could not have designed a better gift for
corporate polluters than a straight-faced argument that there is
no “environment” left to be protected. Regardless, these critiques
do not pose a problem for the primary right for several reasons.
First, these critiques usually conflate the ideas of the pre-human
world with the non-human world; the primary right is based upon
the latter, an ideal, as described below, one can practically reason
about. Similarly, they are incoherent to the extent that they are,
themselves, premised on a logical distinction between the human
and the non-human, as when one refers to “human domination of
the earth’s ecosystems.”125 One extended critique sought to prove
that the original state of nature never existed and thus that
contemporary environmentalists should not try to restore it
(William Cronon ed., 1995). Fully exploring this point is beyond the scope of
this essay but my sense is that Cronon may have been presuming something
this essay does not about the inevitability of population growth when he made
his critique.
121. Purdy, supra note 72, at 1127 n. 5 (providing a good summary of the more
explicit claims).
122. See Jamison E. Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law,
57 ALA. L. REV. 417, 457 (2005).
123. Id. at 457.
124. See generally Jill M. Fraley, Re-examining Acts of God, 27 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 669 (2010).
125. Colburn, supra note 122, at 457. Fraley’s article critiques the notion of
separating the human from the natural, but at one point she herself presumes
the divide. See Fraley, supra note 124, at 682 (“Roast turkey, for example, may
be visibly enhanced using beet coloring extracts. The beet coloring extracts are
a naturally occurring, not human engineered product, but in nature the beet
coloring would not be found within the turkey.”).
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through a series of studies showing that indigenous people
destroyed much of the ecosystems they occupied – studies which
were premised on the distinction between the ecosystems and the
humans causing them damage.126
The ability to objectively distinguish a human from a nonhuman in the world is, as one commentator noted, one of the
foundations of the study of anthropogenic climate change.127 If
we can identify humans and their power, control, and influence
apart from their surroundings, the two are logically distinct, and
to the extent we can measure a spectrum of human influence on
the non-human world, the interest protected by the primary is
coherent. If we can say that one place is more wild than another,
or if we can envision a world without humans, or an ongoing
diminishment in human influence on the non-human,128 then
practical reasoning based on the primary right is possible.
Secondly, because primary right analysis involves a
continuum of human power, control and influence, rather than a
simple dualistic description of the world as divided into the
human and non-human, it avoids the oversimplification, which is
usually the proper target of the critique. The objection that
persons can never entirely reach the ideal, does not defeat the
claim that the ideal might prove a basis for a right, any more
than the claim that a state can never achieve perfect and
universal suffrage defeats the right to vote, or that a state can
never perfect free speech defeats rights aspiring to that ideal.
Thirdly, these critiques all seem leveled at descriptions of the
divide between human and nature – something one would expect
of scientific commentary. However, the primary right described
herein is a normative concept, not a description of the physical
world. Asserting that the Earth is dominated by humanity is no
answer to the argument that we ought to be able to access places
theoretically approaching the wilderness lying at the far end of
the spectrum. The norm of free speech Farber refers to never
relies on the actual predominance of free speech but on the ideal
126. See generally WILDERNESS AND POLITICAL ECOLOGY: ABORIGINAL
INFLUENCES AND THE ORIGINAL STATE OF NATURE (Charles E. Kay & Randy T.
Simmons eds., 2002).
127. Fraley, supra note 124, at 684.
128. See generally ALAN WEISMAN, THE WORLD WITHOUT US (2007).
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of free speech to be asserted against the status quo. In other
words, the ought of free speech to be asserted against the is of a
lack of free speech. That is the whole point of asserting a right.
The normative approach does not involve cold scientific
observation of changes in the world, but hot anger at the ongoing
loss of something valuable, followed by a search for the best way
stop the loss, restore the world as close to the ideal as physically
possible, and take compensation from those responsible for the
restoration, and restitution where restoration falls short. In
short, the danger lies not in falsely dividing humans from nature;
the danger lies in the human world pushing the nonhuman world
out of existence.
In addition to the counterarguments raised above, this essay
has raised several questions among commentators that readers
might find helpful and wish to have answered.
1) Would offering persons that wished to exit the
polity a chance to live alone on a space station
fulfill the primary right?
No, because the person on the station is, while alone and
perhaps outside of the scope of particular political obligations,
still in a world others made and therefore subject to their power.
The primary right is pegged to wilderness as an ideal because
wilderness represents places with relatively little human
influence, the far side of a spectrum of human power. A space
station is the opposite – and conflating it with wilderness is an
example of the territory trap described above.
2) Will the primary right lead to a tragedy of the
commons and does this defeat the right?
No. First, the tragedy of the commons is the overuse of
commonly-owned resources. Owning the wilderness is
antithetical to the ideal of non-polity. Second, the primary right
specifically prohibits influencing others, so many uses, and
certainly overuse, is prohibited. As such, the primary right works
to protect spaces that would be subject to human overuse.
Thirdly, as discussed above, the primary right forces us to look at
the root cause of environmental degradation: human population
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growth. Coincidentally, Garret Hardin, the author credited with
recognizing the tragedy of the commons, also recognized
population (and not common ownership) as the key cause of
environmental degradation. His initial discussion of the tragedy
of the commons and subsequent writings make that clear,129 and
not recognizing that when relying on the tragedy of the commons
model is disingenuous to his work.
Also, were the primary right to cause the tragedy of the
commons, that consequentialist argument would not prima facie
defeat the right any more than claims that a right to be free of
unreasonable search and seizure increase crime. The primary
right is fully supported by the premises of autonomy, power, and
consent described above, and if you accept them you must accept
the right. Undesirable consequences are simply to be balanced
against the right. Moreover, because the primary right has never
been recognized in the world and protected as such, arguments
about its consequences are speculative. That is, why they are
mentioned, but not relied upon above.
3) Is non-polity or wilderness as described in this
essay the same as wilderness as defined under
domestic and international law? Because no legally
defined wilderness area meets the ideal, is the right
defeated?
No. As discussed above, this essay refers to positive law
reflections of the ideal of the non-human world – i.e., duties
imposed on us by the Wilderness Act – that parallel the core
duties that make up the primary right, but the right need not rely
on positive law and the two should not be conflated. The right
stands on its own, assuming one accepts the premises regarding
autonomy, consent, and power that it is derived from. The
primary right provides a theoretical basis for and explains
positive law norms, and its reflection in positive law is evidence
that we value something very much like the right, but it does not

129. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968); Garret Hardin, THE IMMIGRATION DILEMMA: AVOIDING THE TRAGEDY
OF THE COMMONS (1995); Garret Hardin, THE OSTRICH FACTOR: OUR POPULATION
MYOPIA (1999).
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rely on positive law like the Wilderness Act. The primary right is
a reason to change the law, and is not contingent upon it.
4) Does it matter which theory of political consent we
use?
No. While persons might be able to consent expressly,
implicitly, or hypothetically, one of the most important reasons
for recognizing and respecting the primary right is that no form of
consent is possible without an alternative to human polities. One
cannot leave any country if one cannot leave, and truly leave, all
countries.
5) Does the presence of many people in a given tract of
wilderness constitute a violation of all their
primary rights?
No, unless those persons are interfering with others’ bare
autonomy. This is not as theoretical as it sounds but is
comparable to rules laid out under the Wilderness Act and its
regulations, and inherent in what is commonly known as the
“wilderness ethic.” I am exercising something very much like a
balanced version of the primary right when I hike alone for the
day in Yosemite. But because I cannot reasonably access it due to
traffic, and because others constantly cross my path, and because
the flora and fauna have been degraded, and because the nonpolity we call Yosemite is bordered and therefore halted by
clusters of human influence, I am far from the ideal of non-polity.
That ideal, and the primary right that protects it, are reasons to
change existing policies, by weighing my interest in non-polity
more heavily so that whatever is interfering with me approaching
the ideal be stopped. Yosemite is not ideal, but it is closer to the
ideal than Manhattan. Without the ideal I would not know that.
Moreover, that ideal, and the construct of a human right that
protects it, is useful legally because if Congress attempts to
eliminate Yosemite by building strip-malls there, only seeing
access to it as a fundamental right under the Constitution is
likely to protect the area.

49

2012]

THE PRIMARY RIGHT

909

6) Does the primary right ensure Hobbesian chaos in
wilderness by removing a dominant sovereign or
polity?
No. Assuming the primary right is respected, it prohibits the
interference with others, which was the central concern of
Hobbes. If the right is being respected, persons in the wilderness
will not interfere with others, much less kill, maim, or steal from
them. Some will argue that recognizing the right would lead to
such a state of affairs, but it could never be the proximate cause;
people doing that which Hobbes feared is the proximate cause of
such a state of affairs. Moreover, even where the primary right is
the cause, such consequentialist arguments do not prima facie
defeat the right.
7) Is non-polity or wilderness an euphemism for
political anarchy, and thus a reductio ad absurdum
of liberal political thought?
No. Non-polity is a relatively novel concept, especially as
used in this essay. It is a description of an ideal, or value, which
forms the basis of a human right, much the way the value or ideal
of an education forms the basis for claims of a human right to be
educated. Non-polity refers to the ideal of physical space absent
human influence. In contrast, anarchy refers to the absence of
government or political authority. The two differ in several ways.
First, as discussed above, the ideal of non-polity requires one
human alone in the wilderness, whereas anarchy traditionally
refers to persons seceding and living together.130 I distinguish
the primary right from secession above – while the former makes
room for the latter, that room is merely incidental. Second,
anarchy is the absence of political obligation, which I distinguish
above from the absence of power. Non-polity calls for the latter –
not simply a wilderness void of government, but of human
influence upon the person enjoying the right. Finally, because
non-polity is an ideal, balanced against other rights and interests,
it will likely never be fully realized the way anarchy has been and

130. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
633, 634 n.8 (1991).
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will be. One balance will be that non-polities will likely exist,
physically, within the borders of polities and be subject to at least
some form of contingent power, at the very least to protect the
primary right. Balancing the right, as with all rights (like the
right to free speech), does not defeat it. But the primary right,
and the values it collects together conceptually, allow for the
balancing to occur.
8) Is the primary right – a right to be stateless and live
outside any of the nations – something generally
regarded as undesirable?
Yes, depending on the competing rights and interests. As
discussed above, the ideal of non-polity includes not being under
the political authority of a state. While non-polities within
polities might have to be balanced against competing rights and
interests (so that Yosemite, while pristinely non-human, would
still be under the jurisdiction of the United States, which is less
of an influence on my bare autonomy than snowmobiles running
past my camp there), the space between polities (the oceans for
example) might provide a greater opportunity for statelessness.
While some may regard being stateless as undesirable, that may
be because they cannot return to any polity. There is nothing in
the primary right itself that says we have to renounce any
particular form of statehood. Other factors aside, a right to exit
does not itself imply a bar to reentry.
9) Does anthropogenic climate change and other forms
of worldwide environmental degradation mean the
primary right is nugatory because the ideal it seeks
has ceased to exist? Does the presence of political
authority over wilderness areas vitiate the concept?
No.
In fact, we are faced with mass environmental
degradation and the threat of climate change because of the
failure to articulate a first generation human right to a particular
environment, ignoring the compelling weight that the notion of
political consent carries in policy debates and opting instead to
use less effective baselines for environmental regulation.
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Firstly, as discussed above, the ideal at the core of the
primary right, like ideals in all rights, must be balanced against
competing ideals in other rights, e.g., much like the ideal of free
speech is balanced against the ideal of national security. So not
completely reaching the ideal of the primary right – such as the
less-intrusive influence of being under a particular political
authority that happens to never set foot in the wilderness at issue
– is expected. We have a right to speak freely, even though that
right has been balanced against national security concerns. We
can likewise have a primary right that is balanced against others’
right to live in the wilderness. But, just as it is physically
impossible to restore a person who has been tortured to the state
of affairs they were in before the torture, we use that pre-torture
theoretical state of affairs to compensate them in vindication of
their right not to be tortured. The same can be done with the
primary right – we can use the ideal of the non-human world to
practically reason in that direction.
Secondly, while even
wilderness zones would be very much the product of human
influence in that we would have created them by law, non-human
influences would, over time, supersede human influences to make
them relatively non-human.
10) How would the right work “in real life?”
The primary right could be recognized and codified as a
universal, international civil and political right through treaty, as
a logical extension and part and parcel of other rights in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In addition, the right
could be recognized by the United States Supreme Court under a
disjunctive “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”131
fundamental rights analysis for all the reasons, given above, that
the primary right is central to the ordering of liberty. If the
Court can declare, without any textual footing, that procreation is
protected under the Constitution as “one of the basic civil rights

131. Anthony C. Cicia, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A Critical Analysis of
Justice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
2241, 2256-57 (1996).
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of man,”132 it can recognize that right which makes consensual
political association possible.
In either case, via international or domestic law, recognizing
the right would at the least provide a basis to reweigh wilderness
as a value in any legal dispute over the protection or restoration
of wilderness so that it counts for more than a simple interest,
much the way political speech counts for more than a simple
interest when weighed against competing interests.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This essay has introduced the concept of the primary right, a
human rights claim to non-polity and wilderness based upon
autonomy and consent. This right makes a valuable contribution
to environmental law theory by clarifying that if we value the
political autonomy that comes from the possibility of completely
exiting all polities, we are compelled to value the non-human
world and access to it. In other words, if you value autonomy and
political consent, you also value the nonhuman world, and
therefore would presumably want it to exist somewhat nearby.
This essay adds to the literature by forcing us to see the nonhuman world as a medium by which humans exert power over
each other, and by proposing that the baseline for environmental
law – that field of law which regulates the relationship between
humans and the non-human world – should be the non-human
world itself. In the end, the primary right only asks that we be
left alone, literally, that we have the right to be left alone.
The claims made herein are not meant to belittle other
sufficient bases for a right to wilderness, such as diversity and
knowledge. Every argument for the value of “diversity,” in
universities, in corporations, in politics, that is, the diversity
among one species, speaks to a value that is dwarfed by the value
of true and complete biodiversity in the nonhuman world. The
value that biodiversity represents, which is the opposite of a viral
human monoculture, could support the primary right. Even
religious rights could suffice, at least of the thoughtful sort that
truly value the non-human world and commands that we not

132. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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replace it with a human version. However, the primary right is
markedly different from these; it is based upon the values of
autonomy and consent, and thus responds directly to liberals that
make the mistake of pitting individual autonomy and wilderness
protection against one another. The primary right is also
demanded as a human right, which is a way of making a demand
when the speaker and those that agree with her see the thing to
be protected as overriding many of the rules and interests that
make up the status quo. So-called environmentalists, those that
really value the political freedom Thoreau’s absolute freedom and
wildness represent, should have demanded this right long ago
and taken the action necessary to secure it.
In the Senate debate on the 1964 Wilderness Act, Senator
Frank Church of Idaho stated that “without wilderness this
country will become a cage.”133 He may have meant that humans
can never be free of human power, control, and influence if the
non-human world ceases to exist. The primary right is a
powerful, human rights-based argument preventing this. Future
work will show that the primary right can be supported by
positive law (both domestic and international), as further
reflected in common law doctrines like false imprisonment, and
that protecting and promoting the primary right is politically,
economically, and culturally feasible. However, even if the claims
made herein are eventually proven untrue, we are obligated, as a
provisional matter, to protect wilderness and biodiversity while
the debate is being resolved lest we lose the very thing we are
debating.

133. Purdy, supra note 76, at 1172.
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